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UNITED STATES v. TOPCO ASSOCIATES, INC.: ILLEGAL
COMBINATION AND/OR PROCOMPETITIVE ARRANGEMENT?
Before the Supreme Court this term is the important antitrust case
of United States v. Topco Associates, Inc.' The case involves alleged
per se violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act.' The government alleges
that an association of small- and medium-sized regional supermarket
chains violated the Act despite the association's contention that the
purpose and effect of its actions was to increase competition by allowing
its members to compete effectively with large national chains.3 The
issue facing the Court is whether the following agreements among
actual or potential competitors are illegal per se: (1) assignment of
exclusive marketing territories; (2) prohibition against reselling the
association's private-label grocery products at wholesale after title has
passed to individual members. Prior cases involving these issues have
generated considerable confusion.4 The Court now has an opportunity
to clarify and further define the guidelines laid down in those decisions.
THE RULE OF REASON AND PER SE VIOLATIONS
Read literally, the Sherman Act's prohibition against all restraints
of trade is broad enough to strike down every conceivable contract or
combination involving commerce. Soon after the passage of the Act,
however, the Supreme Court recognized that some combinations could
promote trade. Therefore, implementation of the Act required some
standard for determining whether a particular combination violated the
law. In Standard Oil Co. v. United States5 the Court adopted the first
guideline: "the standard of reason which had been applied at the common
1. United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 1031 (N.D. 11. 1970),
prob. juris, noted, 402 U.S. 905 (1971). The appeal from the district court opinion went
directly to the Supreme Court under 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1970).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
3. For a more comprehensive statement of the district court's findings of fact, see
319 F. Supp. at 1032-38.
4. The most notable of the previous cases are United States v. Arnold, Schwinn
& Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) and United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967). See
notes 32-33 et seq. infra and text accompanying. A few of the many articles dealing with
this controversy are: Keck, The Schwin Case, 23 Bus. LAw. 669 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as Keck] : Lundberg, Schwinn and Beyond: The Survival of the Ride of Reason
in Verticalb Tinposed Custoiner and Territorial Restrictions, 30 MONT. L. Rxv. 141
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Lundberg]; Sfikas, Antitrust Consequences of Vertical
Restrictions, 56 ILL. Bj. 1028 (1968) ; Williams, Distribution and the Sherman Act-
The Effects of GeneralMotors, Schwin and Sealy, 1967 DuKE L.J. 732.
5. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
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law and in this country in dealing with the subjects of the character
embraced by the [Sherman Act]. '"6 Shortly thereafter, in Chicago
Board of Trade v. United States,7 the Court stated that a supplementary
test of legality was whether the particular restraint merely regulated
rather than suppressed competition. The determination of this question
necessarily required consideration of the facts in a particular case, in-
cluding "it]he history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the
reason for adopting the particular remedy, [and] the purpose or end
sought to be attained. . .. "' From these cases, the "rule of reason" has
evolved as the basic standard under the Sherman Act.
Because of heavy caseloads and the costly economic analysis involved
in case-by-case application of the "rule of reason,"9 courts began to
develop categories of offenses which had such a "pernicious effect on
competition"1 that they were presumptively unreasonable and illegal
per se. Such per se classifications had the added effect of facilitating
business by delineating simple, clear and predictable guidelines. 1 Among
those practices generally found illegal per se were price fixing, 2 tying
arrangements," group boycotts,' 4 horizontal divisions of markets 5 and
certain vertical restrictions on customers and territories.' The practices
at issue in Topco are horizontal division of markets among competitors7
and vertical restrictions on customers and territories.'8
6. Id. at 60.
7. 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
8. Id. at 238. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing
and Market Division, 74 YALE LJ. 775, 781-82 (1965), discusses the development of the
rule of reason and its "accordian-like career."
9. This principle of per se unreasonableness . . . avoids the necessity for an
incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investigation into the entire
history of the industry involved . . . an inquiry so often wholly fruitless when
undertaken.
Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). See Abend, Applications
of the Per Se Doctrine to Commnerce with Foreign Nations: Desirable or Disastrous,
49 VA. L. REv. 448, 449-50 n.12 (1963).
10. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
11. This principle of per se unreasonableness . . . makes the type of restraints
which are proscribed by the Sherman Act more certain to the benefit of everyone
concerned ...
Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. at 5.
12. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
13. International Salt Co. Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
14. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Fashion
Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
15. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
16. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
17. This arrangement involves companies performing similar functions in the
production or sale of comparable goods or services.
18. This situation can exist among companies standing in a supplier-customer
relationship; e.g., manufacturers and their distributors, wholesalers and their retailers.
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In 1944 the Supreme Court decided United States v. Bausch &
Lomb Optical Co., 9 a case which involved vertical customer and ter-
ritorial restrictions. Bausch & Lomb had granted Soft-Lite an exclusive
right to sell trade-marked lenses. Soft-Lite then established a restricted
territorial distribution system and attempted to control the resale price
of lenses. The Court held that "[a] distributor of a trademarked article
may not lawfully limit by agreement, express or implied, the price at
which or the persons to whom its purchaser may resell ... ,o Al-
though the language supports the conclusion that territorial restric-
tions are illegal per se, this distribution did involve a price-fixing scheme,
and price-fixing had already been declared illegal per se.2
Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States,22 a 1951 case, involved
an Ohio corporation that licensed its trademark to British and French
companies. The Court held that Timken had restrained foreign and
interstate commerce because the companies involved had given each other
exclusive territories, fixed prices and protected each other's markets.
Despite the fact that the Court was dealing with an aggregation of trade
restraints in a horizontal context, Timken is generally accepted as stand-
ing for the proposition that any horizontal division of markets is illegal
per se.2"
White Motor Co. v. United States,24 decided in 1963, was the first
case to reach the Supreme Court on the Justice Department's theory 5
that all vertical territorial restraints were illegal per se. White's distribu-
tion system, made up of wholesale distributors and retail dealers, involved
a combination of exclusive franchises and territorial restrictions. The
district court held that White's vertical territorial restrictions were per
se illegal and entered summary judgment for the Government.26 The
Supreme Court reversed. It found that a vertical territorial limitation
19. 321 U.S. 707 (1944).
20. Id. at 721.
21. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
22. 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
23. See REPORT OF THE ATrORNEY GENERAi's NATIONAL ComIMIssIoN TO STUDY
THE ANTITRUST LAWS 27 (1955).
24. 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
25. Prior to White Motor the Justi e Department had brought numerous actions
attacking vertical territorial restrictions, but all of them had resulted in consent decrees
under which the defendant agreed to discontinue the arrangement. In 1956 the Justice
Department issued a policy statement that it considered all market divisions to be
illegal per se. Hearings on HR. 58, H.R. 2688 and HR. 6544 Before the Subcomm. on
Automobile Marketing Legislation of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 362 (1956).
26. 194 F. Supp. 562, 587 (N.D. Ohio 1961). In support of its holding that vertical
territorial restrictions are illegal per se, the district court cited Addyston Pipe & Steel
Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). Id. at 578.
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could not be classified as illegal per se on a motion for summary judgment
absent evidence showing the "economic and business stuff out of which
these arrangements emerge."27 The Court stated:
[w]e need to know more than we do about the actual impact
of these arrangements on competition to decide whether they
have such a "pernicious effect on competition and lack .
any redeeming virtue" . . . and therefore should be classified
as per se violations of the Sherman Act.28
Although White Motor held only that there was insufficient infor-
mation available to sustain a summary judgment, two subsequent deci-
sions, Snap-On Tools Corp. v. FTC29 and Sandura Co. v. FTC,"0
neither of which reached the Supreme Court, apparently viewed White
Motor as a mandate for the rule-of-reason approach to vertical restrictions.
Both cases rejected a per se approach to vertical marketing systems and,
in essence, found that "good business reasons "' justified certain re-
straints on intrabrand competition. In Snap-On Tools, the manufacturer
of mechanics' hand tools sold products to independent dealers who
resold in restricted territories. The court, relying on White Motor, held
that the record failed to show that Snap-On's vertically imposed ter-
ritorial restrictions had the same inhibitory effect on competition as
horizontal divisions of markets. In Sandura, vertical territorial and
customer restrictions were again upheld. The court noted that Sandura
was a relatively small concern competing with the giants of the floor-
covering industry. Sandura, near bankruptcy and suffering from a bad
product reputation, needed to provide some inducement to attract dis-
tributors. The court found no evidence that intrabrand competition had
been decreased; it did find that competition between brands had been
increased.
MATTRESsEs, BICYCLES AND A NEW PER SE CATEGORY
Probably the two most important cases dealing with territorial
restraints are United States v. Sealy, Inc. 2 and United States v. Arnold,
Schwinn & Co.8" In Sealy, the defendant was charged with price fixing
27. 372 U.S. at 263.
28. Id.
29. 321 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963).
30. 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964).
31. Cf. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 375 (1967).
32. 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
33. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
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and market allocation. In return for royalties, Sealy licensed local manu-
facturers to make mattresses under its trademark and granted exclusive
territories. The approximately thirty manufacturer-licensees substantially
owned Sealy, although the corporation had a separate professional
management. The district court found that Sealy was involved in a
conspiracy to fix prices and enjoined that aspect of the marketing arrange-
ment. On the issue of mutually exclusive territories, however, the
court held that the Government had not proved such conduct to be an
unreasonable restraint of trade. Sealy did not appeal the price fixing
issue, but the Supreme Court reversed as to the territorial restraints,
observing that although the Sealy arrangement was vertical in form it
was horizontal in fact since the manufacturers owned Sealy and were
dividing territory among themselves. The Court held that these horizontal
territorial restraints were part of an "aggregation of trade restraints
including unlawful price fixing""4 and, therefore, were illegal per se.
In order to persuade the Court that a per se rule should not be applied
to horizontal market restrictions, counsel for Sealy posed a hypothetical
situation in which a number of small grocers might allocate territories
among themselves and thereby promote interbrand competition. In re-
sponse to this contention the Court stated that Sealy's "territorial arrange-
ments certainly [do] not require us to go so far as to condemn that
quite different situation .... " By leaving the question open, the
Court may have intimated that there could be an exception to the per se
rule against horizontal allocation of territory.
Schwinl involved vertical customer and territorial restrictions. The
manufacturer used three methods for its wholesale distribution of bicycles:
(1) sales to independent wholesale distributors (Schwinn relinquished
ownerhsip); (2) sales to retailers through wholesalers on an agency
or consignment basis (Schwinn retained ownership) and (3) sales to
retailers with wholesale distributors taking orders and receiving com-
missions (ownership passed directly from Schwinn to the retailers).
The wholesale distributors could sell only in their own territories and
only to franchised dealers approved by Schwinn. The important dis-
tinction in Schwinn was between those goods distributed to wholesalers
under a sales agreement, in which Schwinn parted with ownership, and
those goods distributed to wholesalers under an agency or consignment
agreement, in which Schwinn retained ownership. As to the former, the
34. 388 U.S. at 357.
35. Id.
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Court invoked a per se rule of illegality, 8 but as to the latter, the rule
of reason was applied :
Schwinn adopted the challenged distribution programs in a
competitive situation dominated by mass merchandisers which
command access to large-scale advertising and promotion,
choice of retail outlets, both owned and franchised, and ade-
quate sources of supply. . . . [T]here is nothing in this
record . . . to lead us to conclude that Schwinn's program
exceeded the limits reasonably necessary to meet the compet-
itive problems posed by its more powerful competitors. In
these circumstances, the rule of reason is satisfied.88
THE Topco ORGANIZATION
Topco Associates, Inc. is an association of small- and medium-
sized regional supermarket chains, 25 at the time of suit, operating
stores in 33 states. Topco serves as a co-operative buying organiza-
tion. Through it members can purchase over 1,000 food and related
non-food items, most of which are sold under brand names owned by
Topco. The organization's members acquire nationally advertised brands
through other distribution channels. Members purchase only such items
as they desire from Topco and do not operate under the "Topco" name.
Topco member firms own both the common and preferred stock
of the association in designated proportions. By-laws control the
disposition of this stock so that it cannot fall into the hands of non-
members. Topco is managed by a board of fourteen directors, each
director also being a principal officer of a member chain. The market
share of the members in their various areas varies from 1.4 to 16.3
per cent, averaging 5.8 per cent. In 1967 they had combined retail sales
of 2.3 billion dollars, exceeded only by A & P, Safeway and Kroger.
Although individual sales volumes varied from 1.6 to 182.8 million
dollars, products procured through Topco accounted for only about
36. The Court did not explain how it reached this conclusion. One commentator
questions whether the Court had time to read either the record or the briefs in Schzwnn:
Just about 60 days before oral argument, which was heard on April 20, 1967,
the Schwinn record was filed-23 thick volumes. The government's brief was
filed on March 20, 1967, some 30 days later, and-an extension of time having
been refused-Schwinn's brief came in on April 18, two days before the
argument .... [Tihe decision came down on June 12th....
Pollock, Alternative Distribution Methods After Schwinn, 63 Nw. U. L. Ray. 595, 611-12
n.67 (1968) [hereinafter cited at Pollock].
37. 388 U.S. at 382.
38. Id. at 38081.
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ten per cent of total sales. Topco members compete in their respective
areas with national chains, other regional and local chains and indepen-
dents.
Topco memberships are of three types. Exclusive membership con-
fers on a chain the sole right to self Topco-provided products in the
geographic territory defined in the membership agreement; a non-
exclusive member may sell Topco products but must share his area with
other non-exclusive members; co-extensive membership allows
two or more designated members to sell Topco products within the
same geographic region. Most memberships are exclusive. Non-exclusive
or co-extensive memberships are generally granted only when the mem-
ber chains are not large enough to cover the entire marketing area. No
member may sell Topco products outside his designated territory. This
requirement has limited the expansion of members on some occasions.
Nevertheless, some members operate stores in the territories of other
members but do not sell Topco products in those stores. Topco is con-
stantly seeking new members for unrepresented territories.3 9
THE EcoNoMIcs OF PRIVATE LABELS
Virtually all national supermarket chains have extensive private-
label programs. Indeed, the private label has become an almost essential
element in supermarket competition. A recent study concludes that
private labels have not impaired competition within the food industry."1
Published studies show that private label products are essentially equal
in quality to brand-name products but cost less, thus providing better
values."2 Also, since private labels allow small manufacturers to achieve
production and marketing economies," 8 small firms pressure brand-name
39. The foregoing information on Topco's operations is taken from the district
court's findings of fact. 319 F. Supp. at 1032 et seq. As member chains become large
enough to economically maintain their own private label programs, they usually with-
draw from Topco. The level of annual sales necessary to institute such a program
appears to be 250 million dollars or more. Id. at 1039.
40. W. APPLEBAUm & R. GOLDBERG, BRAND STRATEGY IN UNITED STATES FOOD
MARKETING (1967) [hereinafter cited as APPLEBAUM].
41. [T]he contending forces have grown enormously, have prospered con-
spicuously, and have been able to maintain profit records that compare favor-
ably with other industries .... [N]o one has ever suggested that the business
failures and dropouts that have occurred among food manufacturers, whole-
salers, and retailers were a direct consequence of the battle of the brands.
rd. at 44.
42. Id. at 47.
43. The private label mechanism. . . enables the small food manufacturer
to have access to a mass market with a minimum selling cost and with the
economies of long production runs on a single specified product.
Id. at 82.
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manufacturers to seek product innovations and lower prices."
Research shows that the main reason distributors sell private brands
is to secure customer loyalty to a line of products carried exclusively in
their stores. 5 Although it is generally assumed that private brands are
more profitable to distributors than brand-names, there are no published
statistics to verify this claim."8 Regardless of profitability, however,
distributors will continue trying to strengthen their private-label position
in order to compete with other stores carrying private labels, to provide
a low-cost image for their stores, to put price pressure on national brand
manufacturers and to provide a traffic-building product at a reasonable
price."
THE DISTRICT COURT DECISION IN Topco
In the district court the Government conceded that if Topco, rather
than being a co-operative buying association for smaller chains, were a
single, large national chain, none of its practices would be objectionable
under the antitrust laws.4" It also conceded that Topco's private-label
program enabled its members to compete more effectively with non-
member supermarkets and groceries." Nevertheless, the Government
contended that because Topco's exclusive territory practices cause com-
petition in Topco-controlled brands (intrabrand competition) to diminish
the Sherman Act has been violated as a matter of law, even though the
ultimate result of these practices may be an overall increase in super-
market (interbrand) competition."°
The Government relied on Sealy and Schwinn and asserted that
in both of these cases, as in Topco, "the effect of the agreements was
to substantially eliminate or reduce competition either among manu-
facturers or dealers who might otherwise compete with each other."51
Topco, in response, argued that contracts which have only remote or
incidental adverse effects on competition are not prohibited. 52 It quoted
44. Id.
45. Id. at 45.
46. Id. at 46.
just as manufacturers have some products that produce little or no profit for
them, so do distributors have some private labels that produce little or no profit.
Id. at 47.
47. Id. at 81.
48. 319 F. Supp. at 1040.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1041.
52. Topco relied on the following cases, inter alia: Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United
States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918) ; Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911);
Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578 (1898); United States v. National Football
League, 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
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Mr. Justice Brandeis in Chicago Board of Trade to the effect that "[t]he
mere fact that the parties to an agreement eliminate competition among
themselves is not enough to condemn it. . . .""
In sustaining Topco's contentions, the district court quoted from
Sandura:
The distributors, the dealers and the public will best be served
by the continued economic health and competitive existence of
Sandura as well as its distributors. We are of the opinion that
on this record, the only justified conclusion is that elimina-
tion of the closed territory arrangement would impair com-
petition, rather than foster it."4
The court felt that Sandura was virtually identical with Topco" The
court further stated that it was difficult to determine whether intrabrand
competition had been diminished. There wa5 some evidence that applica-
tions of members to move into the territory of other members had been
denied. In some cases the member whose application had been denied
did not expand into the area; in others it expanded but did not interfere
with the exclusive right of the original member to handle Topco brands.
On occasion, a member resisted the expansion of other members into its
territory, but at other times, in order to expand membership and
strengthen the organization, members agreed to reductions of territory
or franchise changes. Thus, the court found that Topco was not a
"restrictive organization whose members are primarily interested in
keeping new members out and protecting their exclusivity." 6
The court, in its conclusions of law, found that in overall economic
effect, "the Topco cooperative serves a legitimate, procompetitive pur-
pose"57 by: (1) allowing its members to offer the consumer another
high-quality, low-price product; (2) enhancing its members' competitive
position against stronger national and regional chains; (3) enabling its
53. 319 F. Supp. at 1041.
In applying this test a close and objective scrutiny of particular conditions and
purposes is necessary in each case . . . . The question of the application of
the statute is one of intent and effect, and is not to be determined by arbitrary
assumptions. It is therefore necessary in this instance to consider the economic
conditions peculiar to the . . . industry, the practices which have obtained, the
nature of the defendant's plan of making sales, the reasons which led to its
adoption, and the probable consequences of the carrying out of that plan .
54. 319 F. Supp. at 1041-42.
55. Id. at 1042. The court noted the exception that in Sandura the distributorships
were conferred by a manufacturer rather than by a board of existing franchisees. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1038.
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members to remain independently owned and (4) benefiting the small
manufacturers and processors which supply Topco's private label products.
The court also found that "[tIhe Topco licensing provisions are not
inherently unreasonable and have no substantial adverse effect on com-
petition in the relevant market." 8
The court avoided labeling the Topco marketing system either
vertical or horizontal, but instead stated that Topco's licensing provisions
are "reasonable" and ancillary to a legitimate, "procompetitive" purpose.
This language suggests that the court considered the arrangement vertical,
because, in terms of precedent, all horizontal territorial restraints are per
se unlawful and, therefore, not subject to the rule of reason. This logic is
supported by the court's conclusion that the case was virtually identical
with Sandura, in which the arrangement was vertical. But the Topco
marketing arrangement is not vertical. It is horizontal in the same way
that the operation in Sealy was horizontal, for the distributors own
Topco and divide territories among themselves. Moreover, Topco's
member chains actively manage the association, a difference from the
Sealy situation that could make it even easier for the Court to look
through form to the substance of a horizontal combination.
Not having made the vertical-horizontal distinction, the district
court did not specifically address itself to the problems raised by Schwinn
and Sealy. It may be, however, that the effects of those cases will be
minimal. In Schwinn the Court was trying to make most territorial
restrictions illegal and yet to avoid the undesirable effects of inflexibility
by reserving certain exceptions:
On the other hand, as indicated in White Motor, we are not
prepared to introduce the inflexibility which a per se rule
might bring if it were applied to prohibit all vertical restric-
tions. . . . Such a rule might severely hamper smaller enter-
prises resorting to reasonable methods of meeting the com-
petition of giants and of merchandising through independent
dealers, and it might sharply accelerate the trend towards
vertical integration of the distribution process."
If the Court in Schwinn was trying to maintain its options so as
to be able later to carve out exceptions for small companies, the sale-
agency distinction was not the best vehicle for achieving that purpose.
First, small enterprises, especially those that are failing or are new-
58. Id.
59. 388 U.S. at 379-80.
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comers, are least able to afford the added expense of an agency or
consignment distribution system. Second, the sale-agency distinction has
been criticized because it distinguishes between distribution systems that
may have the same economic effect."0 Finally, if the Court was seriously
concerned about retarding "the trend toward vertical integration," 61 it
should consider that reliance upon the distinction may have the opposite
effect. Topco members have testified that the best alternative to the
present arrangement for them will be to develop their own private-label
programs to the extent possible.62 While this may result in a very limited
program for the smaller members, some of the larger members have a
sales volume sufficient to support a nearly complete private-label pro-
gram. 8 It would be ironic indeed if application of the Schwinn agency-
sale distindtion to Topco were to impel these larger chains into the very
sort of vertical integration the Court sought to avoid by the rule. 4
Because of the inadequacies of the sale-agency distinction, Schwinn may
"be narrowly defined" and "may well become authority for little more
than outlawing those practices which have a 'pernicious effect on com-
petition and lack any redeeming virtue'."6 " Likewise, it may be that
Sealy stands for nothing more than the proposition that aggregations of
trade restraints including price-fixing and horizontal territorial restrictions
are illegal per se.66
60. That there is no difference [in economic impact between sale and agency
transactions] can be illustrated by the application of the Schwinn rule to a part
of the marketing program in Snap-On. In that case "during the initial stages
of a dealer's franchise, by way of financial assistance, Snap-On [sold] to him on
consignment. After a dealer [built] up an account equal to the value of his
inventory, the company [sold] to him on a cash basis." At all times the dealer
was subject to territorial restrictions, and presumably any adverse effect that
these restrictions had no competition would be equally present in both the sale
and the consignment transactions. Nevertheless, under the Schwinn rule these
restrictions are per se illegal only when Snap-On ends the consignment arrange-
ment and begins outright sales.
Comment, The Impact of the Schwinn Case On Territorial Restrictions, 46 TEX. L.
R!v. 497, 510 (1968) (footnote omitted).
61. 388 U.S. at 380. Vertical integration is the creation of a marketing systeni in
which "giant" manufacturers control the entire distribution process without independent
distributors or wholesalers. See Note, A Consignment Approach to Vertical Marketing
Restrictions, 43 IND. LJ. 486 n.4 (1968).
62. 319 F. Supp. at 1040.
63. See note 39 supra and text accompanying.
64. Even though 75 per cent of Schwinn's marketing program was upheld, Schwinn
itself has decided to adopt vertical integration. Keck, supra note 4, at 686-87. Schwinn
is taking this action even though the Government assured the Supreme Court that vertical
integration by Schwinn was "an entirely remote possibility." Pollock, supra note 36, at
610 n.60.
65. Lundberg, supra note 4, at 148.
66. Schwinn cited Sealy for this proposition. 388 U.S. at 373, 375-76.
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CONCLUSION
In Topco, the Supreme Court is confronted with a relatively pure
horizontal situation, free of price-fixing and other trade restraints and
involving relatively small businesses in competition with giants. The
horizontal restraints used by Topco impair intrabrand competition
minimally when compared to the enhancement of interbrand competition.
Befter interbrand competition will certainly result in efforts to improve
total efficiency in distribution costs, thereby benefiting manufacturers,
distributors and consumers alike.6"
The Government has conceded that Topco's practices would not be
objectionable if Topco were a large chain. If further admits that Topco's
practices promote more effective competition. An exception to the rule
against horizontal divisions of territory, even after a "sale" of the goods
in question, is, therefore, desirable because per se rules should not be
applied when their effect is anticompetitive.
RICHARD G. BOLIN
67. APPLEBAUM, supra note 40, at 49.
